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John A. Lynn, an expert on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century warfare professor, is a professor of history at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and an adjunct professor at Ohio State University. He lives in Champaign, Illinois.
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DaKevin F. Kileyil 14 giugno 2001 - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Despite the ready availability of material in print, very little is actually understood about the French tactical system that was developed, in both theory and practice, from the period beginning with the disastrous French defeat in the Seven Years' War until the advent of Napoleon as French head of state in 1799. The system has been described as merely 'column versus line' and as the made-up term 'impulse tactics' in other volumes on the period. Here, a case study has been done, and quite succinctly and successfully, by the author on the French Armee du Nord during the period 1793-1794. The French Revolution, besides being a somewhat tumultuous experience for the French nation, was convulsive for the French army. Inheriting a dispirited force from the ancien regime, with a good proportion of its officers deciding to emigrate, and commanded by thoroughly unwashed sans culottes, old Royalist officers who had courageously decided to stay at the risk of their own lives, and recently promoted sergeants and junior officers, these elements were infused with the 'levee en masse' with no time to train them into the steadiness demanded by the 1791 Reglement. Undaunted, those in command, remembering the experiments between the two wars in the use of battalion columns and skirmisher swarms, reverted to this on the battlefield, finally hammering out victories over the armies of reaction and the kings. This excellent volume chronicles the experiences of only one of the myriad revolutionary armies and its progress in the military art. In those parameters what results is fascinating. Officers tried diffeent methods of employing troops in open order; how to assault strong points; coordinate the operations of artillery and infantry on the battlefield; as well as setting up schools of instruction to better facilitate training before letting the troops loose on the battlefield. What we see is a succession of experiments and trial and error, which ended up with a tactical system, if employed properly, would be extremely difficult to defeat. This volume is highly recommended for all who are interested in this fascinating period. Some of what Nord learned would later be incorporated into the tactics of the Napoleonic armies, cross fertilized with the knowledge and experience gained in different theaters and terrain by the other revolutionary armies and their commanders, culminating in the magnificent Grande Armee that marched away from the English Channel in August 1805 and ended up stabling its horses in every capitol of continetal Europe.
DaB. N. Peacockil 12 marzo 2014 - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Anyone wanting to understand how the rag-tag, disorganized French Army became a formidable force must read Lynn's book. Scholarly without being boring, it leads the reader through the opening stages of the Revolutionary Wars, Concentrating on the Armee du Nord, the largest potion of the French Army during this time. A must read for those interested in tactics and men.
3,0 su 5 stelleA Non-Military Analysis of a Military Subject
DaR. A Forczykil 11 febbraio 2001 - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
This is a very academic study of the French Armée du Nord in 1791-4. There are only two maps and no useful appendices. Lynn follows the non-military approach of Janowitz, looking at small group dynamics, political education, etc. There is useful analysis of French doctrine on use of columns, bayonets, artillery, etc. Would have been much better if he had analyzed French forces using more extensive methodology; Lynn ignored intelligence, command control, engineers and only touched on logistics. Lynn also ignored Austrian and Prussian enemies: how good were they? He should have analyzed key battles in greater detail. This was a distinctly non-military study of a military issue. Lynn concludes that the French had developed a new, flexible tactical doctrine by 1794 that when combined with revolutionary élan, made them a force to be reckoned with on the battlefield.
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