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Green Zone: Imperial Life in the Emerald City (Film Tie in) (Inglese) Copertina flessibile – 1 mar 2010

5.0 su 5 stelle 1 recensione cliente

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Dettagli prodotto

  • Copertina flessibile: 368 pagine
  • Editore: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc (1 marzo 2010)
  • Collana: Film Tie in
  • Lingua: Inglese
  • ISBN-10: 1408806347
  • ISBN-13: 978-1408806340
  • Peso di spedizione: 259 g
  • Media recensioni: 5.0 su 5 stelle  Visualizza tutte le recensioni (1 recensione cliente)
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Formato: Copertina flessibile Acquisto verificato
Un saggio che vi apre gli occhi sulla amministrazione americana dell'amministrazione dell'Iraq dopo la cacciata di Saddam Hussein, vista e analizzata dall'interno.
Una critica feroce e obiettiva alle scelte dell'amministrazione Bush.
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Le recensioni clienti più utili su Amazon.com (beta)

Amazon.com: 4.6 su 5 stelle 250 recensioni
5.0 su 5 stelle A good description of reality in occupied Baghdad 24 maggio 2016
Di Gerardo Bruno Lopez - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Formato Kindle Acquisto verificato
I read this book because a close relative of mine, who lived in the “Emerald City” during the time described in the book, highly recommended me to read.

While reading I found some disturbing comments from “real” characters and situations that went on in Iraq. First of all, the “liberation” was not requested by the Iraqis. Sure, Saddam Hussein was tough but held the country under control with an iron fist. Why didn’t the UN or US invade Chile and free the people from Augusto Pinochet? When the US took over Iraq’s administration, those in charge wanted to do a copy paste of the “American way of life”. Iraq had to be a democracy! Why? Most Arab countries are not (United Arab Emirates). There are other regimes in the world that are not and still function quite well (Malaysia). Why did the health system have to be like the one the State of Michigan has? Why is the American way the only way? I am not saying it is bad, but it does not always apply. There are traditions, religion, history, economics and many other things that have to be taken into account and you cannot turn a country around as easy as you would turn a light bulb on or off.

The excuse to invade was the alleged “weapons of mass destruction” which were never found. There wasn’t even a “ops, we are sorry”. Instead there was an overtaking of ignorant opportunists who did not solve much but instead complicated things even further: “We never saw each other as Sunnis or Shiites. We were Iraqis first, but the Americans changed all that. They made a point of categorizing people as Sunni or Shiite or Kurd” (ref: Saad Jawad, professor of political science at Bagdad University).

In the end what happened? Those in charge at the emerald city were un prepared for such a task. The adventure cost American and Iraqi lives, millions of American tax paying dollars were spent. While Americans saw progress, Iraqis saw broken promises. Americans left as liberators but what they really left behind was a civil war.
4 di 4 persone hanno trovato utile la seguente recensione
4.0 su 5 stelle What really happened in Iraq 1 novembre 2012
Di Harry - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Formato Kindle Acquisto verificato
This is a blow by blow account of the US presence in Iraq during the post-War period. The writer is a journalist reporting from Iraq at the time and had access to major US figures who were administering Iraq. He also had access to senior Iraqi figures. Plus he interacted extensively with US soldiers and regular citizens. This experience allows him to assess all major issues from multiple view points. In general, the book concludes that the US mostly failed in its objectives of rebuilding Iraq and in providing security and prosperity to Iraqi people. The book examines various projects overseen by the US: restarting industry and the stock market, rebuilding the education and judicial systems, restructuring the security apparatus and managing the transition to a democratic and secular Iraqi government. Some broad themes emerge as to why the US failed with these projects. First, ideology was emphasized over competence. Americans who understood the Iraqi situation, and had expertise on Iraq, were exiled in favor of those with personal connections or ideological loyalty to the then US administration. These people arrived in Iraq with a preconceived agenda that did not consider the reality on the ground. They acted recklessly without understanding (or even trying to understand) the problem at hand. Second, there were enormous amounts of money spent and wasted. There was inadequate monitoring of funds and assessments of the effectiveness of funds spent. Basic principles of project management were thrown out the window. The overall impression one gets from the book is that the US ideologues considered Iraq their trophy, an experimental ground to try out their pet fantasies, an opportunity to curry favor with the administration, and to advance their careers and ambitions. Sadly, one crucial group was missing from these considerations: the Iraqi people.
4.0 su 5 stelle Awe, and Shock (Bemused shock, that is) 18 agosto 2014
Di Shaw Lynn Preeste - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Formato Kindle Acquisto verificato
I am currently in the process of reading this book. I bought the ebook form for my Kindle reader, but I'm stretching it out by reading it only at certain times.

This is the story, written by a reporter, of the time immediately following our invasion of Iraq. It's the tale of our government (not in the nation building mode) restarting Iraq after the invasion and the riots and looting that immediately followed our "Shock and Awe" campaign. What I've read so far is pretty amazing, but I'm pretty sure I believe every word of it. It is, of course, one person's perspective, and he's getting his information from others who may be somewhat biased in what they're reporting. But, having some idea of how politicians work, there's no reason to doubt how it is told, how people were selected to fill the roles required, and the bluff and bluster that went into rebuilding a government, foreign to us, into a democracy that is foreign to them. This probably deserves a five star rating, but I'm erring on the side of credibility, and there's one star lacking, in my biased opinion. I think just about anyone who was around when the bombs started dropping and the bullets started flying, and who hung on every picture that was shown on this televised war, will enjoy reading this book. You'll read each page, and nod your head, "Uh-huh!"
24 di 24 persone hanno trovato utile la seguente recensione
5.0 su 5 stelle Strong account of life and politics in the Green Zone 9 dicembre 2006
Di Steven Peterson - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Copertina rigida Acquisto verificato
Rajiv Chandrasekaran is with the Washington Post; he has spent time in both Afghanistan and Iraq since the American missions in both places. His experiences in Iraq as well as his interviews with those in Iraq during the time of the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority, under the control of Paul Bremer) and the precursor organization (under Jay Garner)provide important bases for this work. The picture is not pretty, and ties in with arguments advanced by other books on Iraq written of late.

First, as readers already know, there was no real plan for after the war. The book makes it clear that much of the redevelopment of Iraq was ad hoc. Since no one understood how much in tatters the electrical grid was, there was no real preparation for dealing with the degraded system. And the end result was that infrastructure was worse after the war as compared with before. And the CPA was unable to do much to restore power and make the system work better.

Second, many of the "leaders" selected by the CPA were chosen for their political connections. For instance, very young (twenty something) people who had built IOUs from the Administration for, for instance, working in the Bush election campaign, were selected to head units for which they had no expertise at all. Sometimes, seasoned administrators were pushed aside, occasionally because they were not gung ho enough politically.

Third, the CPA was fairly clueless about what was happening on the ground in Iraq. They were slow to pick up on the insurgency, for example. It took them some time to understand the importance of the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. They became landlocked in the "Green Zone," as conditions worsened outside.

The book begins with a quotation from T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia), who said in 1917: "Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them."

The book indicates the number of times when Iraqis were given secondary status to Americans, whether in running organizations or on political decision-making. One important neoconservative, on reflection of his experiences in Iraq, became most disillusioned. He commented to the author: "I'm a neoconservative who's been mugged by reality (page 5)." What began as an easy military victory turned into a quagmire. As the American involvement moved from liberation to occupation, things began to disintegrate. As one Iraqi told the author (page 290): "The biggest mistake of the occupation was the occupation itself."

All in all, one of the more powerful books about the American incursion into Iraq; it is also one of the best descriptions of the CPA's reign in Iraq. It triangulates strongly with other volumes.
1 di 1 persone hanno trovato utile la seguente recensione
4.0 su 5 stelle What results when political loyalty is placed above qualifications.... 19 luglio 2010
Di Yoda - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Copertina flessibile Acquisto verificato
A review of this book would have to start, first and foremost, with what this book is and is not. It is definitely not the story of the run-up to the Iraq war, the actual military invasion or the counter-insurgency. Instead it tells the tale of the those hired to engage in the civilian reconstruction of the country after the "official" end of hostilities (i.e., after President Bush `s famous aircraft carrier landing underneath the "Mission Accomplished" banner) until one year afterwards (the approximate time pro-consul Bremmer departed the scene).

As many Amazon reviewers have noted in their reviews, the book does an extraordinary job at pointing out how pervasive political loyalty was in hiring. There are many stories of very well qualified individuals being passed up for positions so that political hacks from organizations like the American Enterprise or Hoover or Stanford Institutes or those with "reasonable" political views (i.e., anti-abortion) could be hired instead. Examples included medical doctors hired to administer Iraq's hospitals and medical infrastructure without any third world experience and a financial administrator to run Iraq's equivalent of the Security and Exchange Commission who was straight out of school without a single day of work experience. The hiring of these "yes" men had results that had the obvious predictable results (i.e., an inability to get the country's hospital systems and stock market exchanges up and running).

Before Christ was born Confucius had the following exchange with one of his students (Analects of Confucius 13.15): "Is there one single maxim that could ruin a country?", the student asked. Confucius replied: "Mere words could not achieve this. There is this saying , however: `The only pleasure of being a prince is never having to suffer contradiction'. If you are right and no one contradicts you, that's fine; but if you are wrong and no one contradicts you - is this not almost a case of `one single maxim that could ruin a country'?" The placing of political loyalty over qualifications in hiring clearly illustrated the dangers Confucius was attempting to point out.

Another consequence stemming from the placement of political loyalty over and above qualifications, though related to it and one that few other reviewers seem to have commented on, was the resulting idealist detachment from reality that resulted. The 21 year old hired to get Iraq's stock exchange up and running, for example, did not want to settle for just that simple objective but instead strived to set up the leading stock market in the Arab world. Considering the "on the ground" facts this proved impossible. Hence instead of, possibly, achieving the objective of just getting the stock exchange up and running at its pre-invasion level of efficiency and transparency the fool could not even get a stock market to open up at all. Another political loyalist, an administrator responsible for Iraq's university system, instead of striving to get the universities open by supplying textbooks and desks did his very best to push making Iraq's university system comparable to those in Western nations. Again, considering the "facts on the ground", this proved a fantasy and the university system could not even open during his reign.

All of this reminds one of the English admiral Lord Hood's actions at Toulon against the French Directorate (in the early 1790s). There, he had a number of objectives open to him. One was destroying the French fleet. Another was establishing a beachhead for the anti-royalist forces to rally against The Directorate. A third was to foster a counter-revolution by supporting the royalist forces already gathered there. Any one of these may have been achievable realistically. Instead Hood tried to accomplish all three and, inevitably, failed.