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This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Inglese) Copertina flessibile – 18 lug 2011

3.8 su 5 stelle 4 recensioni clienti

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Descrizione prodotto


I would say that her [Carmen Reinhart's] book with Ken Rogoff on debt crises and financial crises is an extraordinary piece of work. -- eral Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, speaking before the House Budget Committee (6/9/2010)

[E]ssential reading . . . both for its originality and for the sobering patterns of financial behaviour it reveals. -- Economist

Reinhart and Rogoff have compiled an impressive database, which covers eight centuries of government debt defaults from around the world. They have also collected statistics on inflation rates from every country where information is available and on banking crises and international capital flows over the past couple of centuries. This lengthy historical study gives what they call a 'panoramic view' of the unending cycle of boom and bust, showing how claims that 'this time is different' are invariably proven wrong. . . . This Time Is Different doesn't simply explain what went wrong in our most recent crisis. This book also provides a roadmap of how things are likely to pan out in the years to come. . . . This Time Is Different is an important addition to the literature of financial history. -- Edward Chancellor, Wall Street Journal

Everyone working on economic policy should own This Time is Different and open it for a bracing blast of sobriety when things seem to be going well. -- Greg Ip, Washington Post

[A] terrific book. -- Andrew Ross Sorkin, New York Times

The authors use copious amounts of data . . . to make the compelling case that any well-informed person should have seen the Great Recession coming. The essence of their book is that while financial crises come in different varieties, they are not mysteriously born of undersea earthquakes, but frequently occurring events that can be spotted and even controlled if politicians and regulators know what to look for. -- Devin Leonard, New York Times

This Time is Different takes a Sergeant Friday, just-the-facts-ma'am approach: before we start theorizing, let's take a hard look at what history tells us. One side benefit of this approach is that the current book manages to be both extremely useful to professional economists and accessible to the intelligent lay reader. The Reinhart-Rogoff approach has already paid off handsomely in making sense of current events. -- Robin Wells and Paul Krugman, New York Review of Books

Professor Rogoff and his longtime collaborator Carmen Reinhart . . . know more about the history of financial crises than anyone alive. The pair have just published their broad survey of financial crises, This Time is Different. In an era when most 'analysts' rely on maybe 30 or 40 years' worth of financial history--and then only that of the U.S.--the authors' knowledge of financial crises and government bond defaults going back to the Spanish empire and before offers a richer perspective. -- Brett Arends, Wall Street Journal

[O]ne of the most important economic books of 2009. -- Jon Hilsenrath, Wall Street Journal

[T]he definitive book on financial crises. -- Steven Pearlstein, Washington Post

Two top-notch economists provide a clear and interesting explanation of why economic crises keep occurring. Broadly speaking, downturns such as the one we are recovering from are historically associated with characteristics that should sound quite familiar to today's investors. -- David Schwartz, Financial Times

[A] masterpiece. -- Martin Wolf, Financial Times

The four most dangerous words in finance are 'this time is different.' Thanks to this masterpiece by Carmen Reinhart at the University of Maryland and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard, no one can doubt this again. . . . The authors have put an immense amount of work into collecting the data financial institutions --Andrew Allentuck, National Post


Carmen M. Reinhart is the Dennis Weatherstone Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. She was previously professor of economics at the University of Maryland. Kenneth S. Rogoff is the Thomas D. Cabot Professor of Public Policy and professor of economics at Harvard University. He is a frequent commentator for "NPR", the "Wall Street Journal", and the "Financial Times".

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Dettagli prodotto

  • Copertina flessibile: 463 pagine
  • Editore: Princeton Univ Pr; Reprint edizione (18 luglio 2011)
  • Collana: Princeton University Press
  • Lingua: Inglese
  • ISBN-10: 0691152640
  • ISBN-13: 978-0691152646
  • Peso di spedizione: 358 g
  • Media recensioni: 3.8 su 5 stelle  Visualizza tutte le recensioni (4 recensioni clienti)
  • Posizione nella classifica Bestseller di Amazon:
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Recensioni clienti

3.8 su 5 stelle
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Formato: Copertina flessibile
Finance is as much important as little known by the average citizen. It is also little known by the largest part of the establishment. This book is a milestone in the process of better understanding how financial crises look like. The key message is of course the one in the title: many financial situations that are unsustainable are actually considered sustainable for a long time before they collapse because involved decision makers believe that for any possible reason "this time is different". While it is not so different. From this work, we also learn that unsustainable financial situations are not so rare, neither in the developed world, like we got used to think before the 2008 "Second Great Contraction" (the first being in 1929). More precisely, it seems that the developed world was somehow able to avoid public debt crises (that in the rest of the world are frequent and create self-perpetuating loops that are very tough for a country to exit) while it has not found a solution to other crises (like bank-crises). Among the rest, it is quite striking how bad a State default can be (we even learn that in the Thirties Terranova lost indepedence because of a default) and how crises tend to be the result of mutiple equilibria situations, where very small events can determine or not the collapse. With a relevant and often original data collection, quite technical yet readable also for the amateur.
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è senza dubbio interessante, documentato e accurato. Tradisce la sua matrice scientifico-tecnica (di alto livello) con una ricchezza di dati ecc che al lettore standard risulta faticosa
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Consiglio questo libro a chi studia economia, anche se alcune parti sono un pochino troppo descrittive, quindi noiose. Comunque non l'ho ancora finito (sono quasi mille pagine), può darsi che migliorerà. Ci sono rimasta male quando ho saputo che i due autori hanno ricevuto delle critiche riguardo a uno studio condotto sul rapporto tra crescita e debito pubblico di un paese, dove affermavano che per i paesi con alto debito era quasi impossibile raggiungere un livello di crescita positivo. Un dottorando ha poi scoperto che avevano sbagliato i alcoli su Excel!
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a classic handbook to read and consult for everyone keen on economics and finance. I repeat: you cannot miss it!
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Le recensioni clienti più utili su Amazon.com (beta)

Amazon.com: 3.7 su 5 stelle 251 recensioni
204 di 219 persone hanno trovato utile la seguente recensione
5.0 su 5 stelle Explaining the Second Great Depresson and Its Potential Aftermath 24 ottobre 2009
Di S. F. Woit - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Copertina rigida Acquisto verificato
Be prepared for a very sobering and complete review of eight centuries of financial crises, complete with charts and graphs that even those who fell asleep in the Macro 101 in college should be able to understand. This book is worth reading in its entirety, but chapters 13 to 17, in which the authors draw important lessons from the 800 years of financial folly for the present course of the "Second Great Contraction of 2007" and its aftermath, make this volume well worth the price.

Also, be prepared for some sobering analysis of the effectiveness of central banks and government policymakers in addressing economic crisis (yes, regrettably, still not very effective even with the benefit of 800 years of history and analysis to draw on). You will learn why This Time is Ultimately Not That Different in so many ways. Carmen Reinhart is a brilliant economist and Ken Rogoff worked at both the Fed and the IMF so they are in a unique position to evaluate the global scope of the 2nd Great Depression in modern history, and it is the very global nature of this event that leads them to conclude that the aftermath with be long-lasting and have profound effects on the global economy for many years to come.

While documenting the fiscal policy response to the Second Great Contraction of 2007, including the massive global government bailouts in the banking sector, Reinhart and Rogoff point out that the size and long-term impact of these measures, while profound, may be dwarfed by the effects on the U.S. national deficit and national debt of reduced Federal tax revenues during the global downturn. With such high levels of debt and limited means to reduce government expenditures to compensate for sharp reductions in tax revenues, the ultimate effect may be a debasing of the U.S. dollar by the Fed, producing a period of increased inflation or stagflation.

The earlier chapters describing periods of hyperinflation, bank and sovereign defaults throughout history are fascinating, leading up to the payoff in the final chapters, in which one can draw one's own conclusions about what course this most recent crisis will take and just as importantly, how policymakers are liable to miscalculate once again. The Federal money-printing presses around the world are in high gear once again, more automated and sophisticated than ancient regal sovereigns clipping coins and extracting gold and silver from the royal coinage to finance their realms.

Proving once again that history doesn't always repeat itself, but it does rhyme.
58 di 62 persone hanno trovato utile la seguente recensione
4.0 su 5 stelle an important and timely book held back by terrible, terrible graphics 31 dicembre 2009
Di Neurasthenic - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Copertina rigida Acquisto verificato
Don't be fooled by the (suberb) Mad Men-style cover art -- this is essentially an academic text, descriptions of Reinhart and Rogoff's compilation of data on domestic and external debt defaults for dozens of countries over hundreds of years. The papers they have circulated and/or published based on this data have received extensive attention in the last year, and this book contains little that will be new to those who have read them. I think that Reinhart and Rogoff were, originally at least, most impressed with the data on domestic defaults but in the aftermath of the 2008/2009 "great contraction," the work on banking crises will probably be of interest to many readers as well.

The book is repetitive, which reflects its origin as a series of independent papers, but which can be viewed as an advantage in that it makes it easier to read (or assign to students) a single chapter, without reading all that has preceded it in the book. The book's great weakness is the terrible design of its numerous time series graphs. Many of these show multiple data series on a single set of axes, with no clear indication of which line represents which data series. I suspect that in whatever software Reinhart and Rogoff used in their original analysis, these lines had different colors, or perhaps one was dashed, but in the rush to publish these details were lost. They can be decoded through a close reading of the accompanying text but, if you can understand a graph only through a close reading of the text describing it, why have a graph at all? Perhaps this will be addressed in later editions.

The book is copiously footnoted, as you would expect for a work of this sort. It's not fun reading but it is authoritative and important. If you're not sure whether or not it will be of interest, google for a copy of one of Reinhart and Rogoff's recent papers on the same topic; several are available freely online. If the paper is interesting to you, the book probably will be too.
294 di 334 persone hanno trovato utile la seguente recensione
3.0 su 5 stelle less than what I hoped for 16 novembre 2009
Di stillafewleft - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Copertina rigida Acquisto verificato
I have little to add to previous reviews of book contents. However, my take away was different than that of prior reviewers. The book provided less than I expected. I had hoped for an attempt to relate the various crises in a holistic manner by considering interplay between banking, currency, internal and external political pressures including war, markets and flaws and excesses therein, debt, inflation, greed of the ruling class, competition between societal classes, etc. I expected to receive the benefit of the authors' experience, wisdom and insight. I imagine such an effort would have required focus on one or perhaps a few comparators for the present situation. That was not the purpose. Instead the book is a vehicle for showcasing an extensive new economic data set developed by the authors of 800 years of economic crises. One receives a birds-eye statistical analysis of that data.

That is not to say that the work was poorly written or uninformative. A number of insights were provided and supported through cogent argument and readable graphics. The text was quite readable though redundant in places. Good effort was made to provide two reading tracks - one for those who wanted to know details behind the analysis and one for those focused on findings and conclusions. Important, recurring themes were demonstrable through the data, and considerable useful and interesting information was certainly provided.

Nevertheless, only a few general and cursory allusions were provided to the "why and wherefore" factors noted above; i.e., context was studiously avoided. Absent consideration of the larger picture including motivations of significant players, the authors' concluding recommendations for avoiding future crises were produced with blinders and appear real-world unrealistic at best.

This is a readable economics text which provides historical economic data that are likely to be relevant to the course of the present crisis. Its weakness is that beyond statistical delineation of selected historical economic markers of risk (which were mostly intuitive in any case) it does not provide insight into the nature of past, present or future difficulty. Perhaps my expectations were misguided but I was not prepared for the measured, academic tone of the book with steadfast refusal to venture beyond the central data set. As such I was disappointed and found the effort sterile and overly long.
98 di 103 persone hanno trovato utile la seguente recensione
2.0 su 5 stelle Serious methodological flaws 26 ottobre 2011
Di Abacus - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Copertina flessibile Acquisto verificato
On April 15, 2013, a year and a half after I had first published this review a study by Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin from the U of Massachusetts came out and refutted the authors main thesis that once a country reaches a Debt/GDP ratio of 90% sees its economic growth contract nearly automatically. This had become a covenant of libertarians such as Paul Ryan and Europeans promoting fiscal austerity. It turns out that Reinhart and Rogoff studies were completely wrong. R&R made numerous mistakes pointed out by the U of Mass team. The main one was to exclude three years out of the New Zealand data during a high Debt/GDP period. During those three excluded years New Zealand had grown very rapidly which contradicted R&R thesis. Once you make those corrections (including a few others that were minute by comparison), there is no statistical difference in growth rate between countries with high Debt/GDP ratio vs ones with lower ones. So much for Austerity. This is a devastating blow to what we thought was a classic study on the subject. Below see my original review. Notice that I had also observed many other flaws with their work but not the one mentioned above since I never saw the data firsthand.

This book is both fascinating and flawed. Starting with the flaws:

First, the book is mistitled. It covers the last 200 years not the last 800.

Second, their crisis framework is convoluted relative to the crystal clear framework of Charles Kindleberger in Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (Wiley Investment Classics). The latter leans on the seminal work of Irving Fisher The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions and Hyman Minsky (the credit cycle exacerbates the business cycle) that the authors completely ignore.

Third, some of their analyses are obfuscating. They baffle the reader on how frequently emerging market countries default with surprisingly low external debt levels. Later, the authors clarify that debt levels are far higher when including domestic debt; then the baffling turns into the self-evident.

Fourth, in Chapter 16, their development of a crisis index measure is weak with no predictive power. The first two graphs capturing this index (ranging from 1 to 5) over the past 100 years have the wrong y-axis (ranging from 0 to 180?) rendering the graph incomprehensible (pg. 253, 254). Two pages later, they use the correct scale (1 - 5).

Fifth, the graph on page 267 denoting the % collapse of exports during the Great Depression has the wrong sign.

Sixth, some of their conclusions are already outdated. They advance that Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain are all doing better than in recent years. The book came out in 2009; didn't those countries show signs of fiscal stress? Since 1800, Greece suffered external debt defaults or rescheduling in over 50% of the years.

Seventh, their argument that large Current Account Deficits (CADs) fuel housing bubbles is not supported. When they show the magnitude of the rise in housing prices over 2002 - 2006 for many countries (Fig. 15.1), it is unclear if there are any relationship between high CAD and housing Bubbles. The housing bubble was far greater in many former USSR satellites than anywhere else (unclear if they had high CADs).

Moving on to the ambivalent OK parts:

1) Their early warning indicators of banking and currency crises (Table 17.1) are interesting. They indicate that 12 month changes in real housing and stock prices are good early signals for banking crises. They mention other metrics such as CAD levels. But, those indicators are unsupported by any statistical analysis.

Moving on to the good parts:

1) Their prototype sequencing of crises represents their best work. It shows how a nation can experience in succession financial deregulation, banking crisis, currency crash, inflation spike, and ultimately default. The tipping point is when a government faces an untenable choice between defending its currency (restrictive policies) and shoring up its financial sector (expansive policies). Governments invariably abandon supporting their currency.

2) Their historical data facilitate interesting observations:

2a) Crisis related to sovereign risks are so frequent, you wonder how countries ever manage to raise debt. While developed countries have "graduated" from defaults, they have not from banking crises. Since 1800, the UK, US, and France have experienced 12, 13, and 15 episodes of banking crises. Banking crises have been frequent since the 1980s. Developed countries are prone to banking crises because financial deregulation is a causal factor. In 18 of 26 banking crises observed since 1970, the financial sector had been liberalized within the preceding 5 years.

2b) Post WWII financial crises have been severe. On average, real housing prices decline by 35% over 6 years; stocks crash by 56% over 3.5 years; unemployment rate increases by 7 percentage points; GDP contracts by 9%; and, public debt rises by 86%.

2c) The US Subprime crisis was more severe than any other post WWII financial crisis. Its housing and stock market bubbles were more pronounced. The US CAD as a % of GDP was larger. The downturn in GDP was more severe. The resulting increase in public debt was faster. The ramp up of all mentioned indicators suggested a financial crisis was imminent. The authors remark that if the US had been an emerging market relying on external debt (in foreign currency), the US dollar value would have plummeted and interest rates soared.

3) When the authors move on to the US Subprime crisis, they note how the majority of experts, including Bernanke and Greenspan, were not concerned regarding the rising US Current Account Deficit (CAD) and rising housing prices. These experts stated the CAD and home price increases were associated with a World savings glut resulting from Asian export led economies. Meanwhile others (Rubini, Krugman, and the authors) were concerned about the CAD sustainability (absorbing 2/3d of World savings), housing prices (in real term rose by 92% between 1996 and 2006 or more than 3 x the 27% increase from 1890 to 1996! See graph pg. 207) and the massive increase in US household debt (rose from a norm of 80% of personal income to 130% by 2006).

If you are interested in this subject, I also recommend Raghuram Rajan's Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy [New in Paper].
147 di 167 persone hanno trovato utile la seguente recensione
2.0 su 5 stelle An Academic Abstract 10 dicembre 2009
Di Shellback - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Copertina rigida Acquisto verificato
When I purchased this book I was expecting to learn about the various financial crisis through out history and the psycholgy that lead up to the crisis. Instead I read a book that was mostly data. Half of the book consists of tables and graphs, another 25 percent explains how the data was collected, and the last 25 percent explains what the data means. The main points I took away from the book are the following:

1. Devaluing a currency is a form of default.
2. Countries in their initial and middle stages of development frequently default on their debt, while advance countries rarely, if ever default on debt, but if they do default they will devalue their currency, which will cause inflation.
3. Banking crisis are usually cased by large drops in home values.
4. It takes years for a country's economy to recover from a banking crisis.
5. During a banking crisis government debt will usually grow on average by 86 percent.

If you are an economics professor who loves to look at data you may enjoy this book, but the average reader will not.