• Tutti i prezzi includono l'IVA.
Spedizione gratuita per ordini sopra EUR 29.
Disponibilità immediata.
Venduto e spedito da Amazon. Confezione regalo disponibile.
This Time Is Different: E... è stato aggiunto al tuo carrello

Spedire a:
Per vedere gli indirizzi, per favore
Inserisci un codice postale corretto.
Spedizione GRATUITA sugli ordini superiori a EUR 29.
Usato: Buone condizioni | Dettagli
Condizione: Usato: Buone condizioni
Commento: Segni / usura piccolo sull'ultima copertina. Grinza / piega media sull'ultima copertina. Amazon Warehouse Deals offre lo stesso servizio di assistenza e le stesse politiche di reso di Amazon.it.
Ne hai uno da vendere?
Passa al retro Passa al fronte
Ascolta Riproduzione in corso... In pausa   Stai ascoltando un campione dell'edizione audio udibile.
Maggiori informazioni
Visualizza tutte le 3 immagini

This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Inglese) Copertina flessibile – 18 lug 2011

3.8 su 5 stelle 4 recensioni clienti

Visualizza tutti i 4 formati e le edizioni Nascondi altri formati ed edizioni
Prezzo Amazon
Nuovo a partire da Usato da
Formato Kindle
"Ti preghiamo di riprovare"
Copertina flessibile
"Ti preghiamo di riprovare"
EUR 15,42
EUR 12,93 EUR 13,32
Nota: Questo articolo può essere consegnato in un punto di ritiro. Dettagli
Ritira il tuo ordine dove e quando preferisci.
  • Scegli tra gli oltre 8.500 punti di ritiro in Italia
  • I clienti Prime beneficiano di consegne illimitate presso i punti di ritiro senza costi aggiuntivi
Come inviare un ordine presso un punto di ritiro Amazon.
  1. Trova il tuo punto di ritiro preferito ed aggiungilo alla tua rubrica degli indirizzi
  2. Indica il punto di ritiro in cui vuoi ricevere il tuo ordine nella pagina di conferma d’ordine
Maggiori informazioni
click to open popover

Spesso comprati insieme

  • This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly
  • +
  • More Money Than God: Hedge Funds and the Making of the New Elite
  • +
  • When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long Term Capital Management
Prezzo totale: EUR 36,43
Acquista tutti gli articoli selezionati

Descrizione prodotto


I would say that her [Carmen Reinhart's] book with Ken Rogoff on debt crises and financial crises is an extraordinary piece of work. -- eral Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, speaking before the House Budget Committee (6/9/2010)

[E]ssential reading . . . both for its originality and for the sobering patterns of financial behaviour it reveals. -- Economist

Reinhart and Rogoff have compiled an impressive database, which covers eight centuries of government debt defaults from around the world. They have also collected statistics on inflation rates from every country where information is available and on banking crises and international capital flows over the past couple of centuries. This lengthy historical study gives what they call a 'panoramic view' of the unending cycle of boom and bust, showing how claims that 'this time is different' are invariably proven wrong. . . . This Time Is Different doesn't simply explain what went wrong in our most recent crisis. This book also provides a roadmap of how things are likely to pan out in the years to come. . . . This Time Is Different is an important addition to the literature of financial history. -- Edward Chancellor, Wall Street Journal

Everyone working on economic policy should own This Time is Different and open it for a bracing blast of sobriety when things seem to be going well. -- Greg Ip, Washington Post

[A] terrific book. -- Andrew Ross Sorkin, New York Times

The authors use copious amounts of data . . . to make the compelling case that any well-informed person should have seen the Great Recession coming. The essence of their book is that while financial crises come in different varieties, they are not mysteriously born of undersea earthquakes, but frequently occurring events that can be spotted and even controlled if politicians and regulators know what to look for. -- Devin Leonard, New York Times

This Time is Different takes a Sergeant Friday, just-the-facts-ma'am approach: before we start theorizing, let's take a hard look at what history tells us. One side benefit of this approach is that the current book manages to be both extremely useful to professional economists and accessible to the intelligent lay reader. The Reinhart-Rogoff approach has already paid off handsomely in making sense of current events. -- Robin Wells and Paul Krugman, New York Review of Books

Professor Rogoff and his longtime collaborator Carmen Reinhart . . . know more about the history of financial crises than anyone alive. The pair have just published their broad survey of financial crises, This Time is Different. In an era when most 'analysts' rely on maybe 30 or 40 years' worth of financial history--and then only that of the U.S.--the authors' knowledge of financial crises and government bond defaults going back to the Spanish empire and before offers a richer perspective. -- Brett Arends, Wall Street Journal

[O]ne of the most important economic books of 2009. -- Jon Hilsenrath, Wall Street Journal

[T]he definitive book on financial crises. -- Steven Pearlstein, Washington Post

Two top-notch economists provide a clear and interesting explanation of why economic crises keep occurring. Broadly speaking, downturns such as the one we are recovering from are historically associated with characteristics that should sound quite familiar to today's investors. -- David Schwartz, Financial Times

[A] masterpiece. -- Martin Wolf, Financial Times

The four most dangerous words in finance are 'this time is different.' Thanks to this masterpiece by Carmen Reinhart at the University of Maryland and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard, no one can doubt this again. . . . The authors have put an immense amount of work into collecting the data financial institutions --Andrew Allentuck, National Post


Carmen M. Reinhart is the Dennis Weatherstone Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. She was previously professor of economics at the University of Maryland. Kenneth S. Rogoff is the Thomas D. Cabot Professor of Public Policy and professor of economics at Harvard University. He is a frequent commentator for "NPR", the "Wall Street Journal", and the "Financial Times".

Non è necessario possedere un dispositivo Kindle. Scarica una delle app Kindle gratuite per iniziare a leggere i libri Kindle sul tuo smartphone, tablet e computer.

  • Apple
  • Android
  • Windows Phone

Per scaricare una app gratuita, inserisci il numero di cellulare.

Dettagli prodotto

  • Copertina flessibile: 463 pagine
  • Editore: Princeton Univ Pr; Reprint edizione (18 luglio 2011)
  • Collana: Princeton University Press
  • Lingua: Inglese
  • ISBN-10: 0691152640
  • ISBN-13: 978-0691152646
  • Peso di spedizione: 499 g
  • Media recensioni: 3.8 su 5 stelle  Visualizza tutte le recensioni (4 recensioni clienti)
  • Posizione nella classifica Bestseller di Amazon: n. 30.348 in Libri in altre lingue (Visualizza i Top 100 nella categoria Libri in altre lingue)
  • Visualizza indice completo
  • Garanzia e recesso: Se vuoi restituire un prodotto entro 30 giorni dal ricevimento perché hai cambiato idea, consulta la nostra pagina d'aiuto sul Diritto di Recesso. Se hai ricevuto un prodotto difettoso o danneggiato consulta la nostra pagina d'aiuto sulla Garanzia Legale. Per informazioni specifiche sugli acquisti effettuati su Marketplace consultaMaggiori informazioni la nostra pagina d'aiuto su Resi e rimborsi per articoli Marketplace.

    Se sei un venditore per questo prodotto, desideri suggerire aggiornamenti tramite il supporto venditore?

Quali altri articoli acquistano i clienti, dopo aver visualizzato questo articolo?

Recensioni clienti

3.8 su 5 stelle
Condividi la tua opinione con altri clienti

Principali recensioni dei clienti

Formato: Copertina flessibile
Finance is as much important as little known by the average citizen. It is also little known by the largest part of the establishment. This book is a milestone in the process of better understanding how financial crises look like. The key message is of course the one in the title: many financial situations that are unsustainable are actually considered sustainable for a long time before they collapse because involved decision makers believe that for any possible reason "this time is different". While it is not so different. From this work, we also learn that unsustainable financial situations are not so rare, neither in the developed world, like we got used to think before the 2008 "Second Great Contraction" (the first being in 1929). More precisely, it seems that the developed world was somehow able to avoid public debt crises (that in the rest of the world are frequent and create self-perpetuating loops that are very tough for a country to exit) while it has not found a solution to other crises (like bank-crises). Among the rest, it is quite striking how bad a State default can be (we even learn that in the Thirties Terranova lost indepedence because of a default) and how crises tend to be the result of mutiple equilibria situations, where very small events can determine or not the collapse. With a relevant and often original data collection, quite technical yet readable also for the amateur.
Commento Questa recensione ti è stata utile? No Invio feedback...
Grazie del feedback.
Spiacenti, non siamo stati in grado di registrare il voto. Provare di nuovo.
Segnala un abuso
Formato: Copertina rigida Acquisto verificato
è senza dubbio interessante, documentato e accurato. Tradisce la sua matrice scientifico-tecnica (di alto livello) con una ricchezza di dati ecc che al lettore standard risulta faticosa
Commento Questa recensione ti è stata utile? No Invio feedback...
Grazie del feedback.
Spiacenti, non siamo stati in grado di registrare il voto. Provare di nuovo.
Segnala un abuso
Formato: Copertina flessibile Acquisto verificato
Consiglio questo libro a chi studia economia, anche se alcune parti sono un pochino troppo descrittive, quindi noiose. Comunque non l'ho ancora finito (sono quasi mille pagine), può darsi che migliorerà. Ci sono rimasta male quando ho saputo che i due autori hanno ricevuto delle critiche riguardo a uno studio condotto sul rapporto tra crescita e debito pubblico di un paese, dove affermavano che per i paesi con alto debito era quasi impossibile raggiungere un livello di crescita positivo. Un dottorando ha poi scoperto che avevano sbagliato i alcoli su Excel!
Commento Una persona l'ha trovato utile. Questa recensione ti è stata utile? No Invio feedback...
Grazie del feedback.
Spiacenti, non siamo stati in grado di registrare il voto. Provare di nuovo.
Segnala un abuso
Formato: Copertina flessibile Acquisto verificato
a classic handbook to read and consult for everyone keen on economics and finance. I repeat: you cannot miss it!
Commento Questa recensione ti è stata utile? No Invio feedback...
Grazie del feedback.
Spiacenti, non siamo stati in grado di registrare il voto. Provare di nuovo.
Segnala un abuso

Le recensioni clienti più utili su Amazon.com (beta) (Potrebbero essere presenti recensioni del programma "Early Reviewer Rewards")

Amazon.com: 3.7 su 5 stelle 262 recensioni
6 di 6 persone hanno trovato utile la seguente recensione
5.0 su 5 stelle Thank you Mr. Reinhart and Mr. Rogoff for making this subject clearer 23 gennaio 2016
Di Mark Ellins - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Formato Kindle Acquisto verificato
I only give five stars for a book I believe will be relevant or universal throughout time. This book has proven without a doubt that countries or regions that go into serious debt, regardless of what century we are in, will cause financial crises. The book analyzes all aspects from many different regions but more in modern times. The title may be a little misleading as it does not provide equal data of centuries old crises just because we don’t have enough information. Massing large amounts of debt occurred in the Renaissance period and up into today but we only have good statistics about recent debt. Therefore, most of the book discusses the recent phenomena of economic crises. The book is trying to show that economic crises have commonalities regardless of the region but this gets unfocused as the book jumps from region to region and country to country. I wish they would’ve taken one example from the beginning until the crisis was resolved and explain step-by-step what occurred and what triggered the crisis and then mention if that phenomena occurred in other countries or regions. Instead the book has many graphs and charts that are convincing but do not dive into the subject and leave with a shallow understanding. But as I mentioned this book should be read by anyone that wants to understand basic foundations for an economic crisis and should definitely be read by our government and executive branch.
4 di 4 persone hanno trovato utile la seguente recensione
5.0 su 5 stelle Impeccable Historical Data and Historical Insights in 2009 Before the 2010 Tarnishing 2 luglio 2015
Di Kathryn Pon - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Formato Kindle Acquisto verificato
Carmen Rogoff is a leading expert on Third World financial crises. Ken Reinhart, former chief economist for the International Monetary Fund, is a top international macroeconomist. Their reputation was tarnished in 2010 when their paper “Growth in a Time of Debt” was found to be not replicable without following their 1. coding error (excluding Australia, Canada and others from the data) 2. unconventional weighting of countries 3. selective/ excluding use of data. (unfortunately GIGO) Questioning their methodology then became generalized (their use of growth regression methodology) which grand scheme “solved” what to this reader looks like a chicken-egg analysis problem.

This book was written before their deification by pro-austerity, less-compassionate politicians. This book lays out the data and the small empirically based “aha's”, which investors can use to practical results. And their successful effort in this book is enormous, teasing out reliable historical data, never found before, especially from the Third World. Never underestimate the power of details. I admire this book completely for its precision. And the conclusion I can draw: Caveat Emptor. The future rhymes with the past. Do not confuse causation and correlation.
1 di 1 persone hanno trovato utile la seguente recensione
4.0 su 5 stelle This is a truly stellar book that everyone interested in economics 28 luglio 2016
Di Peter Schaeffer - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Copertina flessibile Acquisto verificato
This is a truly stellar book that everyone interested in economic and economic history should read. The level of historical analysis is quite high and the amount of detail is immense. That said, it is not an easy read. This is a dense, complex book. The authors write as academics, not entertainers. If you are looking for an economic version of "Game of Thrones", you won't find it. If you are looking for substance, this is very good starting (and ending) point.

The real point of the authors, is that every era thinks "This Time Is Different" and the truth is almost always otherwise. Debt, deficits, and default have been recurring themes throughout human history. They have happened many times before. They will happen many times again. The countries you think will never default, frequently do. Germany is generally regarded as one of the safest creditors in the world (these days). German history suggests otherwise. Greece has been in ruins (economic ruins) for almost 200 years.

The idea that Greece was ever a reasonable credit risk was (is) absurd. Yet, Greece could borrow at rock bottom interest rates for years after it joined the Euro system. Even now, Europe's leaders are trying to prevent a final default (wipe out) on Greek debt. History says that they will lose.
4 di 4 persone hanno trovato utile la seguente recensione
3.0 su 5 stelle Poor for Paperwhite 6 giugno 2013
Di GeoCitizen411 - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Formato Kindle Acquisto verificato
I give this book five stars for content. I found it very interting and thought provoking. We always convince ourselves that this time it is going to be different but when when dealing with human traits (buy/sell/hold decisions fall into this category) it is never different. People haven't changed since we started roaming the planet, so why we expect things to be different is amazing.

The content is a bit intellectual, which isn't bad per se. Maybe because I mainly read before bed, I found it took more concentration to follow then the typical finance/economics stuff I read.

I give this book one star for its Kindle Paperwhite presentation. There are many charts and graphs supporting the text and they are very difficult to read, mainly due to contrast and shades of gray rendering. Perhaps on a color Kindle like Fire this won't be a problem but on the Paperwhite, it is a disaster. If you own a Paperwhite or probably any non-color Kindle, I would avoid buying this book. I feel I wasted my money.

While the charts/graphs are not critical to understanding the points he makes, they are copious and not having them to ponder as you read makes the book less fun.

I recommend the book(content), just not the Paperwhite presentation.
105 di 112 persone hanno trovato utile la seguente recensione
2.0 su 5 stelle Serious methodological flaws 26 ottobre 2011
Di Abacus - Pubblicato su Amazon.com
Formato: Copertina flessibile Acquisto verificato
On April 15, 2013, a year and a half after I had first published this review a study by Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin from the U of Massachusetts came out and refutted the authors main thesis that once a country reaches a Debt/GDP ratio of 90% sees its economic growth contract nearly automatically. This had become a covenant of libertarians such as Paul Ryan and Europeans promoting fiscal austerity. It turns out that Reinhart and Rogoff studies were completely wrong. R&R made numerous mistakes pointed out by the U of Mass team. The main one was to exclude three years out of the New Zealand data during a high Debt/GDP period. During those three excluded years New Zealand had grown very rapidly which contradicted R&R thesis. Once you make those corrections (including a few others that were minute by comparison), there is no statistical difference in growth rate between countries with high Debt/GDP ratio vs ones with lower ones. So much for Austerity. This is a devastating blow to what we thought was a classic study on the subject. Below see my original review. Notice that I had also observed many other flaws with their work but not the one mentioned above since I never saw the data firsthand.

This book is both fascinating and flawed. Starting with the flaws:

First, the book is mistitled. It covers the last 200 years not the last 800.

Second, their crisis framework is convoluted relative to the crystal clear framework of Charles Kindleberger in Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (Wiley Investment Classics). The latter leans on the seminal work of Irving Fisher The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions and Hyman Minsky (the credit cycle exacerbates the business cycle) that the authors completely ignore.

Third, some of their analyses are obfuscating. They baffle the reader on how frequently emerging market countries default with surprisingly low external debt levels. Later, the authors clarify that debt levels are far higher when including domestic debt; then the baffling turns into the self-evident.

Fourth, in Chapter 16, their development of a crisis index measure is weak with no predictive power. The first two graphs capturing this index (ranging from 1 to 5) over the past 100 years have the wrong y-axis (ranging from 0 to 180?) rendering the graph incomprehensible (pg. 253, 254). Two pages later, they use the correct scale (1 - 5).

Fifth, the graph on page 267 denoting the % collapse of exports during the Great Depression has the wrong sign.

Sixth, some of their conclusions are already outdated. They advance that Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain are all doing better than in recent years. The book came out in 2009; didn't those countries show signs of fiscal stress? Since 1800, Greece suffered external debt defaults or rescheduling in over 50% of the years.

Seventh, their argument that large Current Account Deficits (CADs) fuel housing bubbles is not supported. When they show the magnitude of the rise in housing prices over 2002 - 2006 for many countries (Fig. 15.1), it is unclear if there are any relationship between high CAD and housing Bubbles. The housing bubble was far greater in many former USSR satellites than anywhere else (unclear if they had high CADs).

Moving on to the ambivalent OK parts:

1) Their early warning indicators of banking and currency crises (Table 17.1) are interesting. They indicate that 12 month changes in real housing and stock prices are good early signals for banking crises. They mention other metrics such as CAD levels. But, those indicators are unsupported by any statistical analysis.

Moving on to the good parts:

1) Their prototype sequencing of crises represents their best work. It shows how a nation can experience in succession financial deregulation, banking crisis, currency crash, inflation spike, and ultimately default. The tipping point is when a government faces an untenable choice between defending its currency (restrictive policies) and shoring up its financial sector (expansive policies). Governments invariably abandon supporting their currency.

2) Their historical data facilitate interesting observations:

2a) Crisis related to sovereign risks are so frequent, you wonder how countries ever manage to raise debt. While developed countries have "graduated" from defaults, they have not from banking crises. Since 1800, the UK, US, and France have experienced 12, 13, and 15 episodes of banking crises. Banking crises have been frequent since the 1980s. Developed countries are prone to banking crises because financial deregulation is a causal factor. In 18 of 26 banking crises observed since 1970, the financial sector had been liberalized within the preceding 5 years.

2b) Post WWII financial crises have been severe. On average, real housing prices decline by 35% over 6 years; stocks crash by 56% over 3.5 years; unemployment rate increases by 7 percentage points; GDP contracts by 9%; and, public debt rises by 86%.

2c) The US Subprime crisis was more severe than any other post WWII financial crisis. Its housing and stock market bubbles were more pronounced. The US CAD as a % of GDP was larger. The downturn in GDP was more severe. The resulting increase in public debt was faster. The ramp up of all mentioned indicators suggested a financial crisis was imminent. The authors remark that if the US had been an emerging market relying on external debt (in foreign currency), the US dollar value would have plummeted and interest rates soared.

3) When the authors move on to the US Subprime crisis, they note how the majority of experts, including Bernanke and Greenspan, were not concerned regarding the rising US Current Account Deficit (CAD) and rising housing prices. These experts stated the CAD and home price increases were associated with a World savings glut resulting from Asian export led economies. Meanwhile others (Rubini, Krugman, and the authors) were concerned about the CAD sustainability (absorbing 2/3d of World savings), housing prices (in real term rose by 92% between 1996 and 2006 or more than 3 x the 27% increase from 1890 to 1996! See graph pg. 207) and the massive increase in US household debt (rose from a norm of 80% of personal income to 130% by 2006).

If you are interested in this subject, I also recommend Raghuram Rajan's Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy [New in Paper].